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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This case arises under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act ("ADA"). The plaintiff, Joseph B. Taylor, sued Pathmark 
Stores, Inc. ("Pathmark") in the District Court, alleging that 
Pathmark had discriminated against him on the basis of 
his disability or, in the alternative, that Pathmark wrongly 
regarded him as disabled. The District Court granted 
judgment as a matter of law for Pathmark on both claims. 
We will affirm the District Court's judgment on Taylor's 
claim that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, 
but reverse the judgment insofar as the District Court 
determined that Taylor was not regarded as disabled for the 
period between December 1995 and his rehiring in July 
1997. In so doing, we reaffirm that, to successfully claim 
that he was wrongly regarded as disabled from working, a 
plaintiff need not be the victim of negligence or malice; an 
employer's innocent mistake (which may be a function of 
"goofs" or miscommunications) is sufficient to subject it to 
liability under the ADA, see Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 
F.3d 138, 143 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc), although the 
employer's state of mind is clearly relevant to the 
appropriate remedies. We recognize, however, a limited 
defense of reasonable mistake where the employee is 
responsible for the employer's erroneous perception and the 
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employer's perception is not based on stereotypes about 
disability. Under these tests, material issues of fact remain 
for resolution at trial. 
 
Because of its structure and subject matter, the ADA is 
often a difficult statute for courts and employers to 
interpret and, sometimes, to follow. This case is also a 
difficult one, not only conceptually but also because of the 
odd (if not convoluted) factual background, punctuated by 
glitches and apparent misinterpretations of medical 
records, to which we now turn. 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
Taylor began working at Pathmark in May 1981 and was 
eventually promoted to frozen food manager. In December 
1991, he slipped on a piece of cellophane at work and 
strained his right ankle. His doctor instructed him to rest 
the ankle for ten minutes each hour, and to refrain from 
walking or standing for extended periods of time. Taylor 
aggravated the injury in January 1992 when he fell down a 
flight of stairs. He took time off from work, and when he 
returned in November 1992 he was told that the frozen food 
manager post had been filled during his absence. In the 
following months, he was given various light duty 
assignments that accommodated his limitations. He 
stocked shelves, occasionally sitting on a milk crate to do 
so, and worked in the service center, which allowed him to 
sit at a desk for a portion of the day. He was often allowed 
to work on the "bag your own" register at which customers 
bagged their groceries and he could sit on a stool. In 
November 1993, Taylor had arthroscopic surgery, a 
minimally invasive procedure, on his ankle. 
 
The parties have stipulated that Taylor has a 16% 
permanent disability in his right ankle. When he was 
working on light-duty assignments, Taylor wore either an 
air cast or a cast type shoe, and when he exceeded his 
limits on standing and walking for more than fifty minutes 
an hour, he used a crutch or cane. Pathmark allowed this 
periodic resting and use of a crutch or cane until April 29, 
1994. While accommodated in this fashion, Taylor was 
productive and Pathmark's manager considered him a 
problem-free employee. 
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In early March 1994, Taylor's store manager asked him 
to provide an updated note from his doctor setting forth any 
continuing restrictions on work assignments. His family 
doctor, Dr. Moore, provided a note stating that Taylor could 
continue to work, but without prolonged standing. Later 
that month, without Taylor's knowledge, Pathmark's 
corporate headquarters sent a request for an updated 
record for Taylor to his orthopaedic specialist, Dr. Gelman. 
Dr. Gelman replied, in an April 7, 1994, letter, that he had 
not seen Taylor since December of 1993 but that he 
believed that Taylor could return to work without any 
restrictions, basing his opinion on the fact that Taylor had 
not returned to see him. 
 
Relying on Dr. Gelman's letter, Taylor's manager told him 
on April 29 that he had to work a full-duty cash register for 
a day. Taylor felt that he could not comply, refused, and 
eventually left the store. He contacted Pathmark's workers' 
compensation representative and learned for thefirst time 
of Dr. Gelman's letter. He sought an examination with Dr. 
Gelman, after which, on May 5, the doctor sent Pathmark 
another letter stating that Taylor could engage in "full-time 
work--limited standing." Pathmark's administrative offices, 
however, never forwarded the letter to Taylor's manager and 
he was not asked to return to work. Pathmark's internal 
email suggested that there was a "glitch" in this series of 
events because of Dr. Gelman's initial problematic 
evaluation. Taylor's store manager likewise admitted that 
Dr. Gelman's first letter was incorrect and that Dr. Moore's 
note was probably more accurate, but the manager was 
never given Dr. Gelman's updated note of May 5. When 
Taylor called his manager about getting back on a work 
schedule, his manager told him, "I don't care." 
 
On May 27 and September 2, 1994, Pathmark sent 
Taylor to Dr. Case, an orthopaedic surgeon. After the first 
visit, Dr. Case wrote to Pathmark counsel that Taylor could 
work with restrictions, but Pathmark did not invite him to 
return to work. After the September visit, Dr. Case told 
Pathmark that Taylor could return to work with an air splint.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. There is testimony in the appellate record that Case's report said that 
Taylor used an air splint while working, but no testimony that Case 
instructed Taylor to do so. 
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Pathmark apparently took no action for approximately one 
year thereafter. 
 
In September 1995, Pathmark's ADA Committee 
evaluated Taylor and sent Dr. Moore a questionnaire asking 
about Taylor's restrictions. Dr. Moore reported to the 
committee on October 5, 1995, that Taylor was temporarily 
subject to increased work restrictions due to an aggravation 
of his ankle injury in July 1995. The form Pathmark 
provided allowed him to check either "permanent" or 
"temporary," and Dr. Moore checked "temporary," writing in 
that the restrictions would last for six months or more. 
Taylor wrote to Pathmark on December 19, 1995, 
representing that his temporary restrictions had been lifted 
and that he could work under his permanent limitations as 
he had been doing prior to April 1994. The evidence was 
that Pathmark's ADA Committee evaluated his case in late 
1995, but took no action on it for approximately seven 
months, for reasons that are not apparent. 
 
Pathmark fired Taylor by letter dated May 13, 1996. The 
letter, which was written by the ADA Committee, stated 
that Taylor's inability to work "effectively severs your 
employment relationship with Pathmark as of May 13, 
1996." The letter recited that Dr. Moore's restrictions 
allowed Taylor to: stand one hour at a time up to four 
hours a day; walk one hour at a time not to exceed one 
hour a day; lift, carry, push, and pull ten pounds 
frequently, up to twenty pounds occasionally, and never 
over twenty pounds; and occasionally bend, squat, climb, 
and reach. The letter further stated that Taylor's 
restrictions precluded crawling or repetitive pushing and 
pulling of leg controls and required breaks to be taken as 
necessary. The letter continued that, comparing the 
restrictions with the physical requirements of the frozen 
food manager job, 
 
       [t]hese restrictions on your work related activities are 
       such that any reasonable accommodation which 
       Pathmark might provide are insufficient to enable you 
       to function to standard in your position as a Frozen 
       Food Manager which regularly requires: 
 
       * Regularly lifting and carrying 25 pounds 
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       * Frequently stooping, crouching and reaching 
 
       * Extended standing and walking 
 
        Furthermore, your restrictions are such that you 
       cannot perform the essential functions of any other 
       available position, all of which require extended 
       standing and/or walking and regular reaching. We 
       have been advised your restrictions are permanent.  
 
App. at A55-56 (emphasis added). 
 
After Taylor received this letter, he contacted Dr. Moore, 
who clarified his position that Taylor had been temporarily, 
but not permanently, heavily restricted and that Taylor 
could work with either ten minute rest breaks per hour or 
the use of a cane or crutch. Pathmark asked Dr. Moore to 
fill out a new capabilities form, which he did on June 19, 
1996, restating these restrictions, but Taylor was not 
reinstated. There was testimony that the ADA Committee 
realized that its May 13 letter was mistaken, but it never 
reconsidered Taylor or looked into giving him a cashier's job 
with a stool, though he could have been accommodated. 
Instead, the Committee referred the matter to Pathmark's 
legal department and heard no more about it. Meanwhile, 
Pathmark's workers' compensation department was 
insisting that he could return to work full-time. From 1994 
on, Taylor had regularly contacted Pathmark, asking for 
work, and his union representative had also tried to get 
him back to work. After he was fired, he brought this suit. 
He was rehired in July 1997, during the pendency of this 
litigation, and is currently employed as a third-shift non- 
foods clerk. 
 
Taylor argues that Pathmark should have given him a job 
that he could do. Pathmark's Store Operations Employment 
Compliance Manual provides for reasonable accommodation 
in cashier positions for people who have trouble standing 
for extended periods. Pathmark's ADA Training for 
Management Associates manual also suggests that stools 
are reasonable accommodations for people who cannot 
stand for long periods. Taylor's last store manager conceded 
that when Taylor was out on disability he should have been 
considered for a cashier position with a stool. Moreover, 
Taylor and his vocational expert, Thomas Yohe, offered 
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testimony that the frozen food manager job requires a 
significant amount of book work, sales planning, schedule 
writing, looking up orders, checking bills, preparing signs, 
and using a computer, all of which can be done while 
sitting. This amounts to forty-five minutes to an hour of 
sitting per day. Combined with sitting during Taylor's 
morning, afternoon, and lunch breaks, which amount to 
forty minutes per day, Taylor argues that he would be off 
his feet ten minutes per hour without accommodation. 
Yohe testified that Taylor's restrictions could be 
accommodated in his previous Pathmark jobs, including 
the frozen food manager job, with the "minor" 
accommodation of allowing him to use a milk crate to sit on 
or to prop up his foot. 
 
After Taylor had presented his evidence at trial, the 
District Court granted "summary judgment" for Pathmark. 
It would be more accurate to state that the District Court 
granted a motion under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 50(a). Because 
the District Court dismissed the case after Taylor presented 
his evidence to a jury, Pathmark suggests that we should 
give increased deference to the trial judge. Unsurprisingly, 
Pathmark cites no authority for this proposition and, since 
Taylor's claims were not in fact evaluated by his chosen 
finder of fact, we disagree. At all events, Pathmark concedes 
that the proper test is the standard one: We must view the 
facts in the light most favorable to Taylor. 
 
II. Was Taylor "Disabled" Under the ADA? (Was He 
      Substantially Limited in the Major Life Activities of 
       Walking and Standing?) 
 
Taylor's first theory is that he has a "disability" under the 
ADA, which covers impairments that substantially limit a 
major life activity. EEOC regulations provide, and no one 
here contests, that walking and standing are major life 
activities. See 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(1) App. (1996). 
"Substantial limitations" are those that render an individual 
 
       (i) unable to perform a major life activity that the 
       average person in the general population can perform; 
       or 
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       (ii) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner 
       or duration under which an individual can perform a 
       particular major life activity as compared to the 
       condition, manner or duration under which the average 
       person in the general population can perform that 
       same major life activity. 
 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(1) (1996). The relevant factors are (1) 
the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) the duration 
or expected duration; and (3) the expected or actual 
permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the 
impairment. See 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(2). The impairment 
must be severe when compared to the functioning of the 
general population. The purpose of the ADA would be 
undermined if protection could be claimed by those whose 
relative severity of impairment was widely shared. See 
Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986). On the 
other hand, Congress expressed a strong remedial intent in 
enacting the ADA, and explicitly found that approximately 
forty-three million Americans were disabled as of 1990, see 
42 U.S.C. S 12101(a)(1) (1998), which implies that the 
definition should not be so restricted that only the most 
extremely impaired are covered. 
 
Taylor testified that he walks with a slight limp and 
requires ten-minute hourly breaks when standing or 
walking. His girlfriend, however, testified that he regularly 
takes walks after dinner and stated that he does not 
require a cane or crutch. The District Court concluded that 
Taylor did not have a disability. Taylor objects that the 
District Court drew incorrect inferences from his girlfriend's 
testimony. She testified that Taylor takes the car out for 
one-and-a-half to three hours after dinner, that she did not 
know how much time he actually spent walking because 
she was not with him, and that he carries a walking stick. 
Thus, he argues, a jury could infer that he cannot walk 
unassisted for long periods of time. 
 
Even considering this testimony in the light most 
favorable to Taylor, the court's conclusion is sensible. The 
court noted that there was no testimony that Taylor stands 
or walks, during the fifty minutes per hour that he can, 
with any less ability than the average person. The EEOC's 
regulations define a person with a walking disability as 
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someone who "can only walk for very brief periods of time." 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j) App; cf. Deane, 142 F.3d at 143 n.4 
(regulations are entitled to substantial deference). We agree 
with the District Court that fifty minutes (per hour) is not 
a "very brief" period. 
 
In Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 1996), 
we found that a man who limped as a result of a hip injury, 
could not walk more than a mile, and had to climb stairs 
slowly was not disabled. We concluded that the restrictions 
on his ability to walk were "comparatively moderate," citing 
several district court cases that rejected similar claims. Id. 
at 106. Pathmark has also cited other cases in which 
walking problems were found not to constitute covered 
disabilities. See, e.g., Oesterling v. Walters, 760 F.2d 859, 
861 (8th Cir. 1985) (a woman whose varicose veins 
prevented her from standing or walking for long periods 
was not disabled under the Rehabilitation Act's similar 
definition); Penchisen v. Stroh Brewing Co. , 932 F. Supp. 
671, 674 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (a woman with a metal plate in 
her left ankle who could not fully flex her foot or walk with 
a normal gait was not disabled), aff'd, 116 F.3d 469 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 178 (1997). 
 
Taylor argues that Pathmark only allows one break every 
two hours and that his need for a break every hour makes 
him function at less than fifty percent of a typical Pathmark 
employee. The District Court responded that the standard 
is one of comparison to the "average person in the general 
population." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(1) (1996). Taylor 
presented no evidence that Pathmark employees resembled 
the general population in average ability, though he did 
plausibly argue that Pathmark employed people of average 
ability. The more important point is that Taylor is mixing 
scales of measurement. That he can only stand for half as 
long as the average Pathmark employee, or average person, 
is not necessarily proof that he is substantially impaired in 
his ability to stand. The relevant question is whether the 
difference between his ability and that of an average person 
is qualitatively significant enough to constitute a disability. 
Because Taylor can stand and walk for fifty minutes at a 
time, and can continue for longer periods if he takes a 
break every hour, he can carry out most regular activities 
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that require standing and walking, even though he may 
not be able to perform Pathmark's jobs without 
accommodation. We conclude that his ability to walk and 
stand is not significantly less than that of an average 
person. 
 
Taylor finally argues that the employee in Kelly had no 
evidence that he used any special device, cane, or crutches 
to aid in walking. By contrast, Taylor needs a cane or 
crutch after fifty minutes and uses a prosthetic shoe to 
ease his pain and discomfort. Under our jurisprudence, the 
determination whether a disability exists must be made by 
evaluating a person's impairment as it affects major life 
activities without the use of mitigating measures, even if 
the person uses such mitigating measures in regular 
activity. See Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 
136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997).2 Taylor contends that the 
District Court improperly took mitigating measures into 
account when determining his abilities by failing to note 
that Taylor needed ameliorative footwear to maintain his 
present level of mobility. 
 
If Taylor had needed a cane or crutch to stand forfifty 
minutes an hour, his argument would be persuasive. But 
there is no evidence that Taylor required an assistive device 
to stand or walk for at least fifty minutes an hour. If he 
wanted to stand for longer, he needed a cane or crutch, but 
someone like Taylor who can stand for fifty minutes 
unassisted is not substantially limited in standing, and 
thus his need for assistance to improve his performance 
does not show that he has a disability. As for the air 
cast/cast type shoe, Pathmark argues that no doctor ever 
ordered him to use such devices, and that if he did so for 
his own comfort that cannot prove his disability. See 
Douglas v. Victor Capital Group, 21 F. Supp. 2d 379 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (plaintiff used cane or crutches on 
occasion, but there was no evidence he was medically 
required to do so, and voluntary use could not meet his 
burden of proof). We have not been able to find evidence in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Supreme Court will decide this issue shortly. See Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 790 (1999), granting cert. to 130 F.3d 893 
(10th 
Cir. 1997). 
 
                                10 
  
the record that a doctor ordered Taylor to use an air cast, 
and we believe that occasional use of an air cast to 
diminish discomfort does not raise Taylor's condition to the 
level of a disability.3 Therefore we will affirm the District 
Court's judgment on the issue of whether Taylor was 
actually substantially limited in the major life activity of 
walking. 
 
III. Was Taylor "Regarded as" Disabled? 
 
A person is "regarded as" having a disability if the 
person: 
 
       (1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not 
       substantially limit major life activities but is treated by 
       the covered entity as constituting such limitation; 
 
       (2) Has a physical or mental impairment that 
       substantially limits major life activities only as a result 
       of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or 
 
       (3) Has [no such impairment] but is treated by a 
       covered entity as having a substantially limiting 
       impairment. 
 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(l) (1996). Taylor argues that Pathmark 
regarded him as disabled by virtue of the ADA Committee's 
determination that he was too impaired to take any 
Pathmark job, with or without accommodation. 
 
The gravamen of Taylor's claim is that Pathmark 
perceived Taylor as disabled based on a mistaken 
interpretation of his medical records, specifically Dr. 
Moore's October 1995 physical capacity evaluation, wherein 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See supra note 1. The most direct evidence on this point comes from 
Dr. Moore's note to Cynthia Jackson, who apparently was in charge of 
authorizing Taylor's medical expenses for Pathmark's insurer. Dr. Moore 
requested that Taylor be authorized to visit a podiatrist for his ankle 
pain and wrote, "Hopefully, only conservative measures will be needed 
such as a brace or an orthotic." Taylor has identified no further evidence 
that such a visit was authorized or what came from it, and he testified 
that his need for an air cast was only occasional. Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that no material issue of fact exists about 
his medical need for an assistive device to stand for shorter periods. 
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the doctor checked the box marked "temporary" and the 
Committee responded with a letter stating "We have been 
advised your restrictions are permanent." The October 1995 
evaluation, which occurred after Taylor temporarily 
aggravated his ankle, described severe limitations on many 
important activities such as lifting and walking, limits that 
were far greater than those imposed by Taylor's permanent 
ankle impairment. A reasonable jury could therefore 
conclude that Pathmark erroneously regarded him as 
disabled. As Taylor notes, the statement in Pathmark's May 
1996 letter that he was unable to perform any Pathmark 
job, even with accommodation, suggests a perception of 
limits that would likely constitute substantial limitation on 
many major life activities. This is not a case where 
Pathmark stated that he was unable to perform a particular 
job; it appears to have considered him incapable of 
performing a wide range of jobs, indeed, any jobs that 
required significant standing, walking, lifting, or moving 
about (i.e., most jobs in a supermarket). 
 
Several cases support our conclusion that, in general, an 
employer's perception that an employee cannot perform a 
wide range of jobs suffices to make out a "regarded as" 
claim. In Dipol v. New York City Transit Authority, 999 F. 
Supp. 309, 314 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), the court found that the 
plaintiff had proved a "regarded as" claim when, after 
receiving information from the plaintiff's doctor, the 
employer immediately placed the plaintiff on no-work 
status, excluding him from all jobs. In Coleman v. Keebler 
Co., 997 F. Supp. 1102, 1114 (N.D. Ind. 1998), the court 
held that evidence that the defendant concluded that the 
plaintiff could not perform any available jobs in a 
production plant created a material issue of fact on a 
"regarded as" claim. More generally, if an impairment at a 
certain level of severity would constitute a disability, then it 
follows that an employer who perceives an employee as 
having such an impairment perceives the employee as 
disabled. Cf. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 App., S 1630.2(j) ("An 
individual who has a bad back that prevents the individual 
from performing any heavy labor job would be substantially 
limited in the major life activity of working because the 
individual's impairment eliminates his or her ability to 
perform a class of jobs."). 
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The District Court, however, rejected Taylor's "regarded 
as" claim. The court reasoned: 
 
       The thrust of Plaintiff's claim . . . is based on 
       Defendant's failure to accommodate Plaintiff's physical 
       impairment. Plaintiff asserts that based on Dr. 
       Gelman's April 7th note, which stated that Plaintiff 
       could work without restrictions, Defendant demanded 
       on April 29, 1994 that Plaintiff perform the cashier's 
       job. Plaintiff contends that he could not perform the 
       cashier's job as requested because he was substantially 
       limited in a major life activity and therefore disabled 
       . . . . On the other hand, Plaintiff argues that he was 
       wrongfully "regarded as" disabled by his employer with 
       respect to him being employed in the frozen food 
       manager's job, which Plaintiff asserts he could have 
       done without any accommodation by the Defendant. 
       . . . 
 
        Essentially, the Plaintiff is asking the Defendant to 
       treat him as disabled under the ADA if he is assigned 
       to a job other than frozen food manager. In sum, when 
       Plaintiff was initially injured, he provided his medical 
       restrictions to the Defendant. Plaintiff worked for a 
       period of fifteen months asserting these restrictions 
       and Defendant accommodated him. Subsequently, 
       when Defendant learned, from a doctor's note, that 
       Plaintiff was purportedly no longer disabled, Defendant 
       regarded Plaintiff as able, and requested that Plaintiff 
       perform a job affording no accommodation for his 
       impairment. Plaintiff then asserted that he was 
       disabled. Plaintiff now claims that he was not disabled 
       and should not have been regarded as such by the 
       Defendant in the context of Plaintiff 's desire to be 
       assigned as a frozen food manager. 
 
        Plaintiff proposes an apparently impossible situation 
       for an employer. On the one hand, an employer must 
       acknowledge the medical restrictions needed by an 
       employee, while on the other hand it must ignore those 
       same medical restrictions when the employee believes 
       the restrictions might affect his assignment to a 
       desired position. 
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Slip op. at 14 (citations omitted). 
 
We will first consider the District Court's reasoning about 
the conflicts between Taylor's two claims and the time 
frame of his "regarded as" claim, and then turn to a 
broader analysis of "regarded as" protection under the ADA. 
 
A. Allegedly Inconsistent Claims 
 
We conclude that this set of facts was insufficient to 
support a directed verdict for the defendant. The District 
Court concluded that Taylor was proffering both a theory 
that he was disabled and a theory that he was 
wrongly regarded as disabled, which theories undercut one 
another. However, a plaintiff may plead in the alternative, 
and our caselaw finds no difficulty with pairing the two 
claims in one complaint. In Olson v. General Electric 
Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947 (3d Cir. 1996), we expressed no 
discomfort in denying summary judgment on a "regarded 
as" claim where the plaintiff had also alleged actual 
disability, although "the evidence that was apparently 
offered to demonstrate [his] fitness as an employee 
ironically establishes that he was not substantially limited 
in a major life activity." Id. at 953. Similarly, in Arnold v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 860, 862 (1st Cir. 
1998), the court held that there is no conflict in bringing an 
actual disability and a "regarded as" claim together. See 
also Koblosh v. Adelsick, No. 95C5209, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17254, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 1996) (same). 
 
The possibility that a plaintiff will bring both an actual 
disability and a "regarded as" claim is simply one allowed 
by the law; its possible abuse must be checked by the 
standard measures for deterring frivolous or bad-faith 
complaints. Nor is Taylor's position intrinsically 
contradictory, as he could have an impairment (whether or 
not it rose to the level of a disability) that could actually be 
accommodated, despite Pathmark's perception that his 
disability was too severe to accommodate. 
 
At all events, we disagree with the District Court's 
description of Taylor's claims. Taylor did not claim that he 
was "not disabled" with respect to the frozen food manager 
job, as the court suggested; he claimed that the job's 
requirements did not interact with his disability in a way 
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that prevented him from doing the job or that required 
accommodation (beyond allowing him to rest his leg on a 
milk crate from time to time, a measure that may not even 
technically be an accommodation and that we discuss 
further infra). The distinction is highlighted by the example 
of a deaf person who claims that he is qualified for a job 
that involves converting handwritten notes into word 
processing files: He would not be "not disabled" with 
respect to the job, because disability is not a job-specific 
determination, but the job would not be affected by his 
disability. 
 
The District Court also believed that Taylor was putting 
Pathmark in an impossible situation because Pathmark 
would be potentially liable if it accommodated Taylor or if it 
refused to accommodate him. However, Pathmark would 
not be liable for accommodating Taylor. It is only liable if it 
wrongly regarded him as so disabled that he could not work 
and therefore denied him a job. 
 
The accommodations that Pathmark provided or might 
have provided are not part of Taylor's "regarded as" claim. 
Taylor does not attempt to rely on Pathmark's pre-April 
1994 accommodations of his condition to prove his 
"regarded as" claim, nor should he. An employer may 
decide to accommodate people who are not "disabled" under 
the ADA. If the District Court is concerned about the 
possibility of jury confusion on this issue, it might be 
appropriate to instruct the jury that Pathmark's voluntary 
accommodations, which are apparently formalized and 
routinized in Pathmark's employment manuals, are not 
evidence of a perception of disability. 
 
B. The Time Frame of the "Regarded as" Claim 
 
We agree with the District Court that Pathmark regarded 
Taylor as able to work on April 29, 1994, but that is not 
material to Taylor's "regarded as" claim. Taylor's claim is 
that Pathmark erroneously regarded him as entirely and 
permanently unable to work at any job after it received Dr. 
Moore's evaluation in September 1995; his "regarded as" 
claim must be limited to the period following that 
evaluation. Taylor claims that he was not, in fact, so 
disabled that he could not perform any Pathmark jobs. 
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Taylor notes that he provided Pathmark with a letter on 
December 19, 1995, that stated that his restrictions as of 
December 1995 were the same as they had been during the 
November 1992-April 1994 period when he was working at 
Pathmark. The temporary July to December 1995 
restrictions had been lifted. A reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that Taylor was not so impaired that he could not 
work at all after that point, and therefore that Pathmark's 
misunderstanding of his condition prevented him from 
getting work at Pathmark for some period after December 
19, 1995. Under this scenario, Taylor had a viable 
"regarded as" claim after that date. 
 
C. Liability for Mistakes 
 
What a "regarded as" plaintiff must do to put the 
employer on notice that its perception is erroneous is an 
extremely difficult question. Pathmark in effect argues that: 
(1) until Taylor provided definitive notice of his ability to 
work and corrected Pathmark's belief, it cannot be held 
liable for considering him unable to work; and (2) his 
provision of notice proves that Pathmark correctly 
understood his condition after that point. We deal with 
Pathmark's second claim infra Section III.E, while in this 
section we make clear that Pathmark has the initial 
responsibility to evaluate employees correctly. 
 
Pathmark argues that reliance on information given by 
the plaintiff (or the plaintiff's agent) cannot found an ADA 
"regarded as" cause of action. As Pathmark puts it, "For as 
long [as] Dr. Moore's report led Pathmark to believe that 
Taylor required a sedentary position, Pathmark was entitled 
to act accordingly." Pathmark's broad assertion cannot 
carry the day under the peculiar facts of this case. In most 
"regarded as" cases, it is likely that information on an 
employee's abilities comes from the employee or his agent, 
but the source of the information will not necessarily be 
determinative. The fact is that Dr. Moore's report labelled 
Taylor's restrictions "temporary," not permanent. At all 
events, Taylor never provided Pathmark with the conclusion 
that he was substantially limited in a major life activity 
such that there were no jobs at Pathmark that he could 
perform, with or without accommodation. This case is 
dominated by miscommunications and misinterpretations, 
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and one of the points of "regarded as" protection is that 
employers cannot misinterpret information about an 
employee's limitations to conclude that the employee is 
incapable of performing a wide range of jobs. 
 
We find the cases Pathmark cites on reasonable reliance 
to be inapposite. In Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382 
(8th Cir. 1995), for example, the court held that the 
evidence of an employer's perception of an employee's 
abilities based on a doctor's note provided by the employee 
was insufficient to establish a "regarded as" claim. The 
court held that Wooten's employer's perceptions were not 
based on stereotype or myth but on a doctor's written 
restrictions. But the law in this circuit is that a"regarded 
as" plaintiff can make out a case if the employer is 
innocently wrong about the extent of his or her impairment: 
 
       Although the legislative history indicates that Congress 
       was concerned about eliminating society's myths, fears, 
       stereotypes and prejudices with respect to the disabled, 
       the EEOC's Regulations and Interpretive Guidelines 
       make clear that even an innocent misperception based 
       on nothing more than a simple mistake of fact as to 
       the severity, or even the very existence, of an 
       individual's impairment can be sufficient to satisfy the 
       statutory definition of a perceived disability. Thus 
       whether or not [the defendant] was motivated by myth, 
       fear or prejudice is not determinative of [the plaintiff 's] 
       "regarded as" claim. 
 
Deane, 142 F.3d at 144 (citation omitted). 
 
Similarly, Riemer v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 
148 F.3d 800 (7th Cir. 1998), sustained a "regarded as" 
claim where the employer's misperception about the effects 
of the plaintiff 's asthma, based on a doctor's report, led it 
to exclude the plaintiff from an entire class of jobs, and in 
Johnson v. American Chamber of Commerce Publishers, Inc., 
108 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 1997), the court wrote, "If for no 
reason whatsoever an employer regards a person as 
disabled--if, for example, because of a blunder in reading 
medical records, it imputes to him a heart condition he 
never had--and takes adverse action, it has violated the 
statute . . . ." Id. at 819; see also Dipol, 999 F. Supp. at 314 
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(the fact that the employer, after receiving information from 
a doctor, immediately placed the plaintiff on no-work status 
made out a "regarded as" claim); Mendez v. Gearan, 956 F. 
Supp. 1520, 1525 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (employer's mistaken 
perception that a temporary impairment was permanent 
could found a "regarded as" claim).4  
 
We acknowledge the force of Pathmark's argument that it 
relied on information supplied by Taylor's doctor in 
concluding that it had no job available that met his 
restrictions during the period from October 1995 to 
December 1995 (Taylor informed Pathmark that the severe 
restrictions had been lifted on December 19). Taylor has 
not disputed that he did, in fact, have those temporarily 
heightened restrictions after the aggravation of his ankle 
injury. We conclude that a directed verdict as to that period 
was proper, because he has not disputed Pathmark's claim 
that restrictions of such severity precluded him from any 
Pathmark jobs, even with accommodation. 
 
Pathmark further argues that it was reasonable to rely on 
Dr. Moore's first evaluation until June 1996, when Dr. 
Moore filled out an updated questionnaire.5 We cannot, 
however, say that Pathmark's reliance on Dr. Moore'sfirst 
report necessarily excuses it entirely from liability. An 
employer can rely on an employee's information about 
restrictions, but it has to be right when it decides that 
those restrictions are permanent and that they prevent the 
employee from performing a wide class of jobs, as opposed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Dotson v. Electro-Wire Products, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 982 (D. Kan. 1995), 
another case cited by Pathmark, is distinguishable. In that case, the 
physician's note at issue did not describe an impairment that could 
reasonably be thought to substantially limit the plaintiff in a major life 
activity. On receipt, the defendant did not change the plaintiff 's job 
duties or take other actions to indicate that it considered her incapable 
of doing the general class of job. See id. at 991. In contrast, Pathmark 
sent Taylor a letter saying that his restrictions were permanent and that 
he was fired. 
 
5. Pathmark characterizes this second questionnaire as a "changed" 
diagnosis. This is arguably a critical misdescription, since Taylor 
contends that Dr. Moore's restrictions were always temporary, as he 
indicated on the first form, and so the second form simply reflected the 
fact that the temporary restrictions had been lifted. 
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to one particular and limited job. An employer who simply, 
and erroneously, believes that a person is incapable of 
performing a particular job will not be liable under the 
ADA. Liability attaches only to a mistake that causes the 
employer to perceive the employee as disabled within the 
meaning of the ADA, i.e., a mistake that leads the employer 
to think that the employee is substantially limited in a 
major life activity. 
 
Pathmark argues that imperfection in its internal 
procedures--apparently a communication gap between the 
ADA Committee and those responsible for making an 
employment decision about Taylor--should not lead to ADA 
liability. Yet if the relevant decisionmakers wrongly believed 
that Taylor was completely unable to work because of 
miscommunication within Pathmark, the ADA puts on 
Pathmark the burden of correcting the problem, rather 
than leaving Taylor out in the cold. Cf. Deane, 142 F.3d at 
149 (suggesting that informal cooperation and 
communication to correct mistakes is appropriate in a 
"regarded as" situation). Taylor offered Pathmark updated 
information on his condition on December 19, 1995, and he 
had Dr. Moore send further information after he received 
Pathmark's May 1996 letter; therefore, we cannot say that 
he is unarguably responsible for the misunderstanding. 
 
Except for the limited period noted above, judgment as a 
matter of law for Pathmark is inappropriate, because a 
reasonable jury could find that Taylor was not responsible 
for the error. In that case, Pathmark could be liable, even 
if its mistake were otherwise innocent. But on remand, 
Pathmark has a possible defense of reasonability, which we 
describe in greater detail in the next section. 
 
D. A Limited Reasonability Defense 
 
Because the ADA imposes extensive requirements on 
employers and covers a broad range of conditions, new 
puzzles seem to arise from every case. Deane announced 
our conclusion that employer mistakes can lead to 
"regarded as" liability. The question then becomes: What 
limits, if any, are there to this principle? There are no clear 
answers in our precedent, the statute, the legislative 
history, or the EEOC's interpretive guidelines. We must, 
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however, answer the question to resolve this case. We 
believe that guidance can be found in the general logic of 
the ADA, which requires an interactive relationship between 
employer and employee, and concomitantly requires an 
individualized evaluation of employees' impairments. See 
Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., No. 98-1273, ___ F.3d ___, 
1999 WL 184138 (3d Cir. Apr. 5, 1999).6  
 
While prejudice is not required for a successful"regarded 
as" claim, we recognize that the ADA has as a major 
purpose the protection of individuals who are subject to 
stereotypes about their abilities. An employer who regards 
a kind of impairment--epilepsy, for example--as 
disqualifying all people affected by the impairment for a 
wide range of jobs is thus not entitled to a defense of 
reasonable mistake; under the ADA, it is the employer's 
burden to educate itself about the varying nature of 
impairments and to make individualized determinations 
about affected employees. However, there is no evidence in 
this case that Pathmark decisionmakers were infected with 
stereotypes or prejudice against the disabled. In situations 
such as this one, which do not involve prejudice, we think 
that a limited defense best serves the aims of the ADA: If 
the employer is factually mistaken about the extent of an 
employee's impairment, and the employee or his agent is 
responsible for the mistake, the employer is not liable 
under the ADA.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We are also influenced by the Supreme Court's decisions in Faragher 
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and Burlington Industries, 
Inc. 
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). In those cases, the Court determined 
that general principles of agency law justified imposing Title VII 
liability 
on employers for sexual harassment committed by supervisors, but 
defined an affirmative defense to liability in order to give employers 
incentives to create effective anti-harassment programs. The details of 
the defense were dictated by concerns for logic and equity, not by Title 
VII's explicit provisions. We take the same path here. 
 
7. We note that it will not always be immediately clear whether a 
particular physician is an employee's agent. For example, whereas in 
Delaware, a worker seeking workers' compensation has a right to select 
an independent physician, see 19 Del. Code Ann. S 2323 (1998), the 
Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act allows an employer to 
establish a list of designated physicians or health care providers, and an 
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We emphasize that it is not reasonable for an employer to 
extrapolate from information provided by an employee 
based on stereotypes or fears about the disabled, and we 
think that the distinction between the effects of a type of 
impairment and an impairment's extent adequately 
captures the distinction: A belief that anyone with bipolar 
disorder or HIV infection is substantially limited in a major 
life activity is a conclusion about the effects of the 
impairment and only secondarily about the particular 
employee. An employer with such a belief is failing to make 
an individualized determination, as the ADA requires, and 
thus acts at its peril. If an employer believes that a 
perceived disability inherently precludes successful 
performance of the essential functions of a job, with or 
without accommodation, the employer must be correct 
about the affected employee's ability to perform the job in 
order to avoid liability; there is no defense of reasonable 
mistake. Any other outcome would defeat the ADA's 
attempt to eradicate what may be deeply rooted and 
seemingly rational presumptions about the abilities of the 
disabled. 
 
By contrast, a mistake about the extent of a particular 
employee's impairment made in the course of an 
individualized determination is further from the core of the 
ADA's concern, and a reasonability defense adequately 
protects employees' interests in not being erroneously 
regarded as disabled. We reaffirm that an employer is liable 
for mistakenly regarding an employee as disabled, unless 
the employer's perception is based on the employee's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
employee may be required to visit one of those on the list in order to 
maintain a workers' compensation claim, see 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. S 531(1)(I) 
(1998). An employer's employment, ownership, or control of such 
physicians or health care providers must be disclosed in order for them 
to be placed on the list. Even if the providers on the list are 
independent, 
if the employer designates them and relies on their judgments, the onus 
may well be on the employer, rather than the employee, to correct their 
mistakes. It is also possible that the list will consist of independent 
providers negotiated by the employees' labor union and the employer. 
See 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. S 1000.6(a)(3) (1998). We express no opinion on all 
these agency issues, which are not present here and will have to be 
resolved on a case-by-case basis. 
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unreasonable actions or omissions. The limited exception to 
liability for mistakes can be expressed as follows: If an 
employer regards a plaintiff as disabled based on a mistake 
in an individualized determination of the employee's actual 
condition rather than on a belief about the effects of the 
kind of impairment the employer regarded the employee as 
having, then the employer will have a defense if the 
employee unreasonably failed to inform the employer of the 
actual situation.8 
 
This rule is consistent with our decision in Deane, in 
which we emphasized the employer's failure to take 
reasonable steps to learn the true extent of the plaintiff 's 
impairment. See Deane, 142 F.3d at 145. In Deane, we 
found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
plaintiff had been perceived as disabled where the record 
documented confusion among the relevant decisionmakers 
as to the extent of the plaintiff 's physical impairment. See 
Deane, 142 F.3d at 145. Pathmark attempts to distinguish 
Deane by noting that the defendants in that case relied on 
a short phone conversation with the plaintiff to conclude 
that she could not perform any available job. The Deane 
court noted that the defendants did not evaluate the 
plaintiff, contact her physician, or independently review her 
medical records, but relied on one phone conversation with 
her. See Deane, 142 F.3d at 145. By contrast, Pathmark 
relied on Dr. Moore's medical report. 
 
The Deane facts do not define the outer limits of liability. 
Pathmark apparently made a significant error in treating 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We recognize that there is a continuum of perceptions and that there 
will be difficult cases, but we think that our formulation provides 
appropriate guidance. For example, an employer who is informed that a 
particular individual has epilepsy might overestimate the limiting effects 
of that individual's epilepsy because of a general perception about the 
severity of epilepsy. If the employer mistakenly overestimates the degree 
of a person's impairment based on perceptions about the nature of the 
impairment, it is not basing its decision on an individualized evaluation. 
Moreover, the employer's defense would fail in such a case because the 
employee would have done nothing unreasonable in informing the 
employer of her condition. The employer should seek further specific 
information about the extent of the employee's impairment before it 
concludes that the employee is disabled. 
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Taylor's temporary restrictions as permanent. Taylor also 
offered evidence that Pathmark did not engage in a process 
of communication and cooperation, as we counseled 
employers to do in Deane. See id. at 149.9 Additionally, 
Pathmark argues that Taylor acted unreasonably under the 
circumstances: He waited until after the ADA Committee 
made its decision to have his doctor submit a new report. 
However, Taylor did not know until the May letter that 
Pathmark considered him permanently unable to work, and 
he did communicate with Pathmark in December 1995, 
approximately five months before he was fired, about his 
reduced restrictions. 
 
While Pathmark argues that Taylor bears the "lion's 
share" of responsibility for any miscommunication that 
occurred, there is evidence to the contrary. Taylor appears 
to have consistently sought reinstatement. Pathmark's own 
electronic mail suggests that his saga included"glitches." 
Pathmark waited approximately seven months after the 
ADA Committee considered his case to send him notice that 
he was terminated, apparently because of an often- 
postponed meeting of counsel. The ADA Committee itself 
did not meet on Taylor's case for one year after Pathmark's 
doctor last examined him, which constitutes a significant 
delay. Moreover, the record reflects that an outside 
consultant advised Pathmark that "sharp disparities" 
between Taylor's self-report and Dr. Moore's evaluation led 
her to "strongly advise that an attempt be made to resolve 
the discrepancies." 
 
While there are no fixed rules for what an ADA plaintiff 
must do to correct an employer's expressed misperception, 
we think that a jury could find that Taylor did not act 
unreasonably in these circumstances and that Pathmark 
was responsible for the misunderstanding. Reasonability is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Pathmark also seeks to distinguish Deane by noting that there was a 
factual dispute in that case as to whether lifting was an essential 
function of the job, and there is no such dispute here. But that question 
goes to a totally different element of the plaintiff 's case, which is 
whether the plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential functions of 
the 
job. Taylor is not saying that Pathmark was wrong about the job 
description; he is arguing that Pathmark was wrong about him, at least 
after December 1995. 
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a fact-specific test, and, of course, the employee must have 
reason to know of the basis of the employer's decision 
before he can unreasonably fail to correct a mistake. This 
rule will encourage communication between employer and 
employee, in the same way that the interactive process for 
determining reasonable accommodations does. See Taylor, 
___ F.3d at ___ (discussing the requirements of the 
interactive process). 
 
E. Actual Causation 
 
Pathmark argues that it never regarded Taylor as 
disabled. It states that, when Dr. Moore gave it updated 
information in June 1996, it then understood that Taylor's 
restrictions were no longer as serious as they had 
previously been. Arguably, Pathmark simply decided not to 
take Taylor back, even knowing that he could work, until 
July 1997.10 
 
Taylor responds that we cannot simply take Pathmark's 
word that it knew he was not disabled but refused to act on 
that information, since Taylor was never privy to its "secret 
thought processes." In this posture, Taylor's argument is 
persuasive. If we were to accept Pathmark's argument, a 
plaintiff 's attempts to disabuse an employer's 
misperceptions about his disability could be used to 
eviscerate a "regarded as" claim; this would encourage 
potential plaintiffs to avoid communicating with employers 
and begin litigation that might otherwise be avoided. 
Particularly given the reasonability defense set forth in the 
previous section, we think that Pathmark cannot rely solely 
on Taylor's communications with it to prove that Pathmark 
did not regard him as disabled after June 1996. 
 
We note in this regard that the lack of internal 
communication, to which Pathmark appeals when asking 
us to excuse its reliance in 1994 on the various conflicting 
doctors' notes, could also have left Pathmark with a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. If the contention were that Pathmark used Taylor's disability as a 
pretext for ridding itself of an employee with seniority under the union 
collective bargaining agreeement, Taylor would not have a successful 
claim that he was regarded as disabled. The ADA prohibits 
discrimination, not action taken using discrimination as a pretext. 
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continuing erroneous belief about Taylor. The ADA 
Committee, by its member's own testimony, never learned 
why Taylor was not accommodated and rehired, and a 
reasonable jury could conclude that the relevant Pathmark 
decisionmakers--apparently Pathmark counsel, in this case 
--continued to regard Taylor as disabled. 
 
F. Remaining Issues 
 
Pathmark also argues that Taylor never proved that there 
was a job that he could do that was open during the 
relevant time period. As Pathmark points out, it has no 
duty to create a special job for a disabled person. See 
EEOC Technical Assistance Manual at 90.0530 (an 
employer is not required to create a new job or bump an 
employee from an existing job as a reasonable 
accommodation); cf. Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 
1996) (reaching the same result under the functionally 
identical Rehabilitation Act). Specifically, Pathmark argues 
that Taylor never proved that there was an available frozen 
food manager position during the relevant period; his old 
job was filled before he returned in 1992, and nothing in 
the record shows that there was a vacancy thereafter. 
Unless there was a frozen food vacancy, Pathmark 
persuasively reasons, there can be no causal connection 
between Pathmark's perception of Taylor's abilities and its 
failure to give him the frozen food job. Taylor responds that 
he did not pursue the frozen food job more aggressively 
because his union representative was told that he was 
going to be put back to work. This is an issue of fact to be 
resolved on remand. 
 
Taylor also suggests that he would have wanted to be 
considered for a cashier job, and there apparently were 
cashier vacancies for which the ADA Committee could have 
considered him. Pathmark's own ADA manuals suggested 
that cashier jobs did not require extended walking and 
standing. Furthermore, under the ADA the employer may 
be required to participate with a covered employee to 
identify a vacant position that the employee can perform, as 
employees may otherwise lack the ability to identify such 
positions. See Taylor, ___ F.3d at ___, slip op. at 35-36; 
Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Therefore, there is at least a genuine and material issue as 
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to whether Pathmark would have had a position for Taylor 
in 1996. 
 
If Taylor prevails, the District Court might have to decide 
in the first instance whether a "regarded as" plaintiff is 
entitled to accommodation even though he is not disabled. 
We have yet to resolve this issue. On the one hand, the 
statute does not appear to distinguish between disabled 
and "regarded as" individuals in requiring accommodation. 
On the other, it seems odd to give an impaired but not 
disabled person a windfall because of her employer's 
erroneous perception of disability, when other impaired but 
not disabled people are not entitled to accommodation. See 
Deane, 142 F.3d at 149 n.12. 
 
The debate over accommodation has heretofore focused 
on what constitutes a "reasonable accommodation," not on 
the definition of "accommodation" vel non. In its natural 
meaning, an "accommodation" would seem to be some 
change in the way the employer normally requires or allows 
the job to be done.11 If the employer routinely allows 
employees to perform a job in one of several ways and an 
employee chooses one of those ways, perhaps in order to 
alleviate an impairment that does not rise to the level of a 
disability, then there would not seem to be any 
"accommodation" involved. 
 
In this case, the requested "accommodation" is the use of 
a milk crate to sit on while stocking lower shelves. This 
may or may not be a true accommodation, and it might 
therefore be unnecessary to reach the difficult question of 
entitlement to accommodation. See App. at A256 
(vocational rehabilitation specialist testified that "I believe 
there would be little or no real accommodation necessary" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines 
"accommodation" as, inter alia, "something that is supplied for 
convenience or to satisfy a need," "the provision of what is needed or 
desired for convenience," or "adaptation, adjustment." Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary 12 (1966). The last definition seems most 
appropriate to the context of the ADA. None of these definitions would 
make the standard conditions of a workplace "accommodations," as 
preexisting conditions or practices would not be "supplied" or "provided" 
to take account of an employee's disability. 
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for the frozen food job); id. at A257-58 (reaching the same 
conclusion about stock jobs). Pathmark's representative 
testified that use of a milk crate created "safety issues," but 
this was called into question on cross-examination, and 
Taylor testified that he used a milk crate to do his job for 
fourteen months without objection from Pathmark. 
Moreover, Taylor's expert, Yohe, testified that the use of 
milk crates was standard in supermarket stocking 
generally. There is thus a material issue of fact as to 
whether use of a milk crate was a standard way to perform 
stocking duties at Pathmark. 
 
Furthermore, even if use of a milk crate is an 
accommodation and Taylor is not entitled to 
accommodation, he may well be entitled to other forms of 
relief, such as injunctive relief and damages, as well as 
attorney's fees, and so the accommodation question is not 
critical to the success of his claim. See Deane, 142 F.3d at 
149 n.12. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This factually complex case presents us with novel issues 
under what may be the most difficult part of a difficult 
statute. Adhering to our precedent that mistakes may lead 
to liability under the ADA, we hold that, in this case, a jury 
could find Pathmark responsible for its mistaken 
impression of Taylor's abilities, and that a jury could also 
find a causal link between Pathmark's mistake and its 
failure to rehire Taylor in one of his former positions. 
However, Taylor does not suffer from an actual disability. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court on Taylor's actual disability claim, affirm 
it on Taylor's "regarded as" claim from September 1995 to 
December 19, 1995, and reverse it on the "regarded as" 
claim for the period following December 19, 1995. 
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